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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code section 197, permitting the amortization of certain intangible assets, in an effort to simplify the law and reduce the number of controversies with respect to the
federal income tax treatment of intangibles.1 While section 197 is of
benefit to many industries, it is unduly harsh to the real estate industry.
Congress, in its enactment of section 197, adopted the position of the Internal Revenue Service that a purchaser or heir can acquire nothing more
from a seller or a decedent lessor than an interest in land and improvements.2
Section 197 provides that no portion of the acquisition cost of an interest in
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law; of counsel, Ireland,
Stapleton, Pryor & Pascoe, P.C., Denver, Colorado. A.B., 1958, University of Michigan;
J.D. with distinction, 1961, University of Michigan. I would like to thank members of the
faculty of the University of Seattle School of Law, members of the faculty at the University of
Buffalo School of Law, and members of the Erie County Bar Association for their many helpful suggestions made during and following colloquia at which I presented earlier versions of
this Article. Thanks are also due to Juliann Dyson and Kyle Boschen for their invaluable research assistance.
1. See I.R.C. § 197; H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 672-73 (1993),
reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1088, 1361-62. All citations to sections of the Internal Revenue Code in this Article are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended before June
1996.
2. See infra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
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real property3 or an interest under an existing lease of tangible property4 is
subject to amortization under that section.5
In addition, consistent with the Internal Revenue Service’s position,
Congress expressly provided that when property is acquired subject to a
lease, no portion of the adjusted basis may be allocated to the leasehold
interest.6 The entire adjusted basis must be taken into account in determining the depreciation deduction (if any) with respect to the property subject
to the lease.7 This position, particularly in the case of an acquisition from
a ground lessor, may result in a substantial distortion of the acquiring
party’s income. The Conference Committee Report contains an example
of the operation of the rule against separate allocation to the leasehold interest. The Report states that
if a taxpayer acquires a shopping center that is leased to tenants operating retail stores, the portion (if any) of the purchase price of the shopping center that is attributable to the favorable attributes of the leases is
to be taken into account as a part of the basis of the shopping center
and is to be taken into account in determining the depreciation deduction allowed with respect to the shopping center.8

The position adopted by Congress forces the heir of, or purchaser
from, a lessor of improved real property to treat the cost of any interests
acquired from the lessor in addition to the lessor’s interests in land and
improvements as part of the cost of the land and improvements. At best,
this requires the heir or purchaser to depreciate the cost of any additional
interests over the remaining life of the improvements rather than amortizing it over fifteen years as permitted under section 197(a).
But, what is allowed to one purchasing or inheriting from a ground
lessor?9 With the exception of the ground lessor’s interests in improvements,10 the cost of any other interests acquired from a ground lessor must
be added to the cost of the land.11 If these interests were amortizable or
3. See I.R.C. §§ 197(e)(2), (f)(3).
4. See id. § 197(e)(5)(A).
5. The effect of these provisions is explained in the Conference Committee Report in the
following manner:
[N]o good will, going concern value or other Section 197 intangible is to arise in
connection with the acquisition of . . . real property. . . . Instead, the entire cost of
acquiring such real property is to be included in the basis of the real property and is
to be recovered under the principles of present law applicable to such property.
H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 213, supra note 1, at 688, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1377.
6. See I.R.C. § 167(c)(2).
7. Id. § 167(c)(2).
8. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 213, supra note 1, at 681-82, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 1370-71.
9. A ground lessor is the owner and lessor of unimproved real property.
10. For example, the ground lessor’s residuary interest, if any, in improvements constructed by the lessee.
11. This is because the only other asset that the ground lessor “owns,” in an income tax
sense, is the land.
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depreciable before the enactment of section 197, sections 167(c)(2),
197(e)(5), and 197(f)(8) now prohibit such amortization or depreciation.12
As a result, the cost of interests acquired from a ground lessor, other than
land, cannot be recovered until the sale of the land unless one or more of
these interests can be treated as an interest in improvements since improvements are depreciable.13 If the interest is not an interest in the improvements but does contribute to the realization of current rental income,
the fact that its cost cannot be recovered until the sale of the land will result in a substantial distortion of the purchaser’s or heir’s income.
I will demonstrate in this Article that a purchaser or heir can acquire
from a ground lessor a number of interests in addition to the lessor’s interest in the land. In addition, I will show how some of those interests can
be depreciated or amortized despite the provisions of sections 167(a)(2)
and 197. Finally, to the extent that some of these interests cannot be amortized or depreciated, there occurs a material distortion of the acquiring
party’s income. I suggest that sections 167(a)(2) and 197 should be revised to permit amortization or depreciation of these interests so that the
material distortion of income does not arise. Part II of this Article describes a hypothetical situation to illustrate how this problem arises. Interests that can be acquired from a ground lessor, other than land, are described in part III. Part IV briefly describes the position of the Internal
Revenue Service with respect to the acquisition of interests, other than
land, from a ground lessor. The analysis of authorities contained in part V
demonstrates that interests, other than land, can be acquired from a
ground lessor. Finally, part VI concludes with a discussion of the present
treatment of interests, other than land, acquired from a ground lessor.
II. HOW THE VALUE OF LAND CAN EXCEED ITS VALUE AS AN
UNENCUMBERED FEE
Landowner owned a vacant two-acre lot (the land) in a fashionable,
primarily residential area. Developer approached Landowner to inquire
whether the land was available for the development of an executive suite
hotel. This type of development was permitted under the zoning of the
land then in effect. Landowner indicated that the land was available but
that she preferred not to sell the land at this time. Developer stated that
Landowner’s reluctance to sell the land did not concern him. He would
simply lease the land from Landowner, build an executive suite hotel on
it, and then sublease the land and the hotel to the financially sound, leading operator of executive hotels. Landowner liked this approach and negotiated the terms of a ground lease with Developer.

12. See I.R.C. §§ 167(c)(2), 197(e)(5), 197(f)(8).
13. See id. § 167(a).
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Landowner asked for an annual rent that was at the top of the fair
rental range for similar land. Landowner requested an annual increase in
the rent equal to the dollar equivalent of any increase in the cost-of-living
index. In addition to the above increase, Landowner wanted the annual
rent increased every five years by a percentage of the previously paid annual rent. The burden of paying the “carrying costs” of the land, such as
real estate taxes, was to be placed on Developer. Landowner proposed
that the lease have a reasonably long term and that Developer’s obligations under the lease be guaranteed by the hotel operator. Finally, Developer was required to agree to maintain and repair the hotel and, upon
termination of the lease, deliver to Landowner possession of the hotel in
good condition and repair, with ordinary wear and tear excepted. Developer agreed to all of these requests. The lease was prepared and executed.
Developer then constructed an elegant executive suite hotel.
The executive suite hotel was a success. Landowner was pleased with
the development and the use of her land. Unfortunately, after approximately one-quarter of the lease term had passed, Landowner encountered
some financial difficulties and decided to sell her interest in the land. She
calculated the value of her interest as an unencumbered fee.14
Prior to setting a sale price for the land, Landowner asked the opinion
of her financial adviser. After careful thought and analysis, the financial
adviser suggested a sale price in excess of the value of Landowner’s land
as an unencumbered fee. Landowner trusted the financial adviser and, as
a result, asked for the price suggested by the financial adviser. To Landowner’s great surprise, within just a few days, an investment group
agreed to purchase her interest for the asking price. After the sale was
closed, Landowner asked the financial adviser why anyone would place a
higher value on—and pay more for—an interest in land subject to a
ground lease than the value of the land as an unencumbered fee. She further inquired whether her interest would have had the same value in her
estate had she died prior to selling the land. In addition, Landowner was
curious about how the purchaser or an heir would treat, for income tax
purposes, the portion of the purchase price paid for, or the valuation of,
the land that exceeded its value as an unencumbered fee.
III. REASONS FOR THE VALUATION AND/OR PURCHASE OF THE LAND AT
A VALUE IN EXCESS OF THE LAND’S VALUE AS AN UNENCUMBERED FEE
The excess value can be attributed to independent factors impacting the
value of the land. For example, it is possible that rents derived from real
14. In simple terms, for the purposes of this Article, the value of the land as an unencumbered fee is determined by ascertaining the rental that the land would produce free from the
ground lease and the improvements made by the lessee under the ground lease and capitalizing
that income with a multiplier that reflects the return expected for similar real estate.
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estate similar to the land exceed the return that could be earned on other
available investments having similar risks. As a result, an investor, in order to obtain an investment in real estate, may pay somewhat more than
the unencumbered value of the land since, even after paying the increased
value, the investor would earn a return greater than the return on other
investments having similar risks. The excess value may also result from
changes in zoning or land use regulations or development that may limit,
in the future, the amount of real estate that could be put to uses similar to
those to which the land in question could be put. While these changes may
not currently affect the rent that can be obtained, perhaps an investor who
foresees these changes will pay more for the land than its present unencumbered value.
The value in excess of the land’s unencumbered value may also be attributed to the ground lease. For example, the rent paid under the lease
may exceed the rent that is currently paid for unencumbered real estate
similar to the land. The excess rent may be attributable to the negotiating
skills of the ground lessor and his or her ability to achieve a rental return
in excess of that available for similar parcels of land. Or, it may be that
the rent available for similar parcels has declined since the execution of
the ground lease and, as a result, the rent being paid under the lease is
greater than that which can currently be obtained for similar parcels.15
Four possibilities exist with respect to the duration of the excess rent.
First, the excess rent may be attributable solely to the existing ground
lease and, upon termination of the ground lease, the then-available rent
may decline to the rent that can be obtained from similar real estate. Second, the rent that can be obtained from similar real estate may increase
over the remaining term of the lease so that the rent obtainable from the
land after termination of the lease will be equal to, or in excess of, the
rent paid under the lease. Third, the excess rent may be consideration for
renewal or purchase options or the purchase of the leased land pursuant to
a purchase option, or it may be compensated for by low rent during renewal periods. Finally, the excess value may be attributable to the presence of a strong and desirable tenant. An investor may pay more for the
15. See, e.g., Moore v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 906 (1950), rev’d, 207 F.2d 265 (9th
Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954), on remand, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 869 (1955); W.
Reed Quilliam, Jr., Depreciation of Property Acquired Subject to a Lease: Premium Lease
Rentals as a Wasting Asset, 4 VAL. U. L. REV. 261, 272 (1970); Raymond Rubin, Depreciation of Property Purchased Subject to a Lease, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1134, 1135 (1952); Note,
World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1303 (1963) [hereinafter Harvard
Note]; Jules R. Willen, Note, Depreciation of Tenant-Erected Building by Purchaser of Fee,
23 MD. L. REV. 353, 357 (1963) [hereinafter Maryland Note]; Note, Purchaser’s Depreciation Rights in Property Subject to a Lease, 82 MICH. L. REV. 572, 573, 588-89 (1983)
[hereinafter Michigan Note]; Note, Depreciation Disallowed on Inherited Leased Property, 3
UTAH L. REV. 130, 131-32 (1952) [hereinafter Utah Note]; Irwin W. Feldman, Note, Taxation Depreciation of Tenant Erected Improvements by Purchaser-Lessor, 1963 WIS. L. REV.
484, 485, 489, 491 (1963) [hereinafter Wisconsin Note].
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land and, as a result, obtain a lower return because the tenant under the
ground lease (or the subtenant) is a desirable tenant and is financially
strong, presenting little or no risk of default.16
The excess value of the land may additionally be attributed to factors
resulting from improvements made to the land. For example, the economic life of a building constructed on the land by the lessee may exceed
the term of the ground lease. The lessor’s reversion in the building accounts for the excess value.17 An investor also may pay more than the unencumbered value of the land because a substantial improvement erected
by the lessee, even though the improvement’s economic useful life is less
than the remaining term of the lease, provides security for the lessee’s
performance of the lease and makes the land more leasable in the event of
the lessee’s breach.18 In addition, an investor may ascribe a value to the
ground lessor’s ability to use a lessee-constructed improvement as security for a loan to the ground lessor.19 Finally, the excess value may be
based on a combination of the foregoing reasons.
IV. THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE TREATS THE EXCESS VALUE OR
PRICE OF THE LAND AS PART OF THE BASIS OF THE LAND
When the excess value is due to factors directly impacting the land, it
should be treated as part of the purchaser’s or heir’s basis in the land. The
purchaser or heir has acquired nothing but the land. However, when the
excess value is derived from the ground lease or the “security value” of
the improvements, the Internal Revenue Service and many courts still
treat the excess value as part of the basis of the land. It is sometimes said
that one cannot split an investment between land and a subdivided part of
the land, such as a lease of the land. The excess value, since it is incident
to the fee, merges into the fee.20 If the excess value is attributable to the
16. See, e.g., Quilliam, supra note 15, at 266; Note, Lessee-Erected Improvements Securing Long-Term Leases: An Overlooked Depreciation Deduction for the Landlord, 63 YALE L.J.
872, 875 (1954) [hereinafter Yale Note].
17. See, e.g., Alvin D. Lurie, Depreciating Structures Bought Under Long Leases: An
Adventure in Blunderland, 18 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX’N 43, 56 (1960); Quilliam, supra note
15, at 264; Mikel M. Rollyson, Long Waiting Line at Geneva Drive-In, 4 J. REAL EST. TAX’N
364, 368 (1977); Michigan Note, supra note 15, at 586.
18. See, e.g., Lurie, supra note 17, at 48; Quilliam, supra note 15, at 264, 266; Rollyson, supra note 17, at 368; Rubin, supra note 15, at 1144, 1147; Wisconsin Note, supra note
15, at 487; Yale Note, supra note 16, at 874-75, 877.
19. As used in this Article, the “security value” of lessee-constructed improvements is the
value the ground lessor derives from the improvements’ (1) acting as security for the performance of the lessee’s obligations under the ground lease; (2) making the real estate more leasable on
termination of the existing lease; and (3) being available to serve as security for a loan to the ground
lessor.
20. See, e.g., Midler Court Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 590 (1974), aff’d,
521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975); Schubert v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960), aff’d, 286
F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.
1236 (1945); Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939), aff’d, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.
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rent paid pursuant to the lease’s being in excess of the rent that could be
derived from the land at the time of its acquisition, but not in excess of
the rent that could be derived following the termination of the lease, it has
been asserted that the holder of the lease will suffer no loss through exhaustion since the same rent will be available after termination of the
lease.21 Alternatively, it is said that the excess rent is really the consideration for renewal options, purchase options, or the purchase of the leased
land, or that it is made up for by lower rents during the renewal periods.22
Finally, at the present time, sections 167(c) and 197(e)(5) require, in
some cases, that the excess value be added to the basis of the land.23
Another way of rationalizing the position that excess value arising
from the ground lease or leasehold improvement should be added to the
basis of the land is that a devisee or purchaser cannot acquire an interest
greater than that owned by the decedent or seller. If a seller or decedent
had no economic interest in the lease or in a leasehold improvement, a
purchaser or devisee cannot acquire one.24 This position is correct if what
is meant is that the purchaser or devisee takes the land as the seller or decedent held it—subject to the ground lease. The position is not correct if
what is meant is that since the seller or decedent had no basis in the lease
or improvement, the purchaser or devisee cannot acquire one.
When the excess value is derived through a leasehold improvement, a
number of reasons have been given for treating that value as part of the
basis of the land. For example, it is asserted that there cannot be more
than one taxpayer depreciating the same building at the same time.25 In
instances in which the ground lessor does not acquire title to the improve-

1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941); Lurie, supra note 17, at 52-53; Quilliam, supra note
15, at 266; Maryland Note, supra note 15, at 354, 357; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at
492; Yale Note, supra note 16, at 877.
21. See, e.g., Moore v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), rev’g 15 T.C. 906
(1950), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Friend, 40 B.T.A. at 771; Quilliam, supra note 15,
at 272, 275; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 492.
22. See, e.g., Fieland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 743 (1980); Midler Court Realty, 61
T.C. at 596.
23. See I.R.C. §§ 167(c)(2), 197(e)(5).
24. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Mass.
1970), aff’d, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970); Barnes v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 960 (D.
Mass. 1963), aff’d sub nom. Buzzell v. United States, 326 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1964); Goelet v.
United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff’d, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959);
Schubert, 33 T.C. at 1054; Rollyson, supra note 17, at 366; James V. Heffernan, Note, Depreciation Allowable on Lessee-Constructed Property Subject to Long-Term Lease, 37
CORNELL L.Q. 323, 326 (1952) [hereinafter Cornell Note]; Maryland Note, supra note 15, at
356; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 487.
25. See, e.g., Moore, 207 F.2d at 272; Lurie, supra note 17, at 57; Rollyson, supra note
17, at 366; Rubin, supra note 15, at 1147; Cornell Note, supra note 24, at 325; Maryland
Note, supra note 15, at 356; Yale Note, supra note 16, at 878.
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ment until the termination of the lease, a few courts have attempted to tie
the ability to depreciate to the ownership of the improvement.26
Another reason given for prohibiting a ground lessor’s devisee or purchaser from adding the excess value to the leasehold improvement and
depreciating it is that the leasehold improvement is said not to be used in
the trade or business or for the production of income by the purchaser or
devisee.27 It is the land that produces the rent. Therefore, neither the purchaser nor the devisee can depreciate the improvement.28 While it is undoubtedly true that the land is the source of the rent, this position does not
recognize that the improvement can have a direct impact on the quality
and predictability of that rent.29
The economic life of a leasehold improvement made by the lessee affects whether the excess value will be treated as part of the basis of the
improvement or of the land. For example, if the economic life of a leasehold improvement is less than the term of the ground lease, it is reasoned
that a purchaser or devisee from the ground lessor cannot have acquired
an interest in the improvement, since the improvement will be “used up”
by the time the lease terminates.30 On the other hand, if the economic life
of the improvement exceeds the term of the lease, the excess value can be
attributed to the lessor’s reversion in the improvements on termination of
the lease. The reversion, however, is not subject to exhaustion until termination of the ground lease and, therefore, is not depreciable until that
time. In this instance, once the ground lease terminates, the devisee or
26. See, e.g., First National Bank of Kansas City v. Nee, 85 F. Supp. 840, 842-43 (W.D.
Mo. 1949), motion for new trial overruled 92 F. Supp. 328 (W.D. Mo. 1950), aff’d, 190 F.2d
61 (8th Cir. 1951); Lurie, supra note 17, at 46; Rollyson, supra note 17, at 366; Cornell Note,
supra note 24, at 327; Maryland Note, supra note 15, at 354.
27. See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960), aff’d, 286 F.2d 573 (4th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961); Goelet, 161 F. Supp. at 310-11; First National
Bank of Kansas City, 85 F. Supp. at 842-43; Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 764, 772 (1977), aff’d, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Quilliam, supra note 15, at
263, 279; Rollyson, supra note 17, at 365-66, 368-69; Cornell Note, supra note 24, at 330;
Maryland Note, supra note 15, at 354; Michigan Note, supra note 15, at 582, 584; Utah Note,
supra note 15, at 131; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 486, 489.
28. See supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962),
rev’g 35 T.C. 7 (1960); Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th
Cir. 1948), rev’g 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 498 (1947); First National Bank of Kansas City, 85 F.
Supp. at 840; Geneva Drive-In Theatre, 67 T.C. at 764; Millinery Ctr. Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 817 (1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
granted, 350 U.S. 820 (1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 456 (1956).
30. See, e.g., Moore v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), rev’g 15 T.C. 906
(1950), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954), on remand, 14 T.C.M. 869 (1955); Commissioner
v. Pearson, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951), rev’g 13 T.C. 851 (1949), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
861 (1951); M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Mass. 1970),
aff’d, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970); Rowan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 865 (1954); Quilliam,
supra note 15, at 263, 276; Rollyson, supra note 17, at 366; Rubin, supra note 15, at 1147;
Cornell Note, supra note 24, at 325; Maryland Note, supra note 15, at 354, 356; Utah Note,
supra note 15, at 130-31; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 487.
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purchaser will be able to depreciate the excess value attributable to the reversion.31
It may be, in the case of excess value allegedly attributable to either
the lease or the improvement, that the taxpayer will fail to carry the burden of proof in demonstrating the allocation of the excess value among the
leasehold improvement, lease, and land. If this burden is not met, a court
will determine that the excess value must be treated as part of the basis of
the land.32 It may also be asserted that the appraisal or the purchase price
was simply too high, that the appraiser was wrong, or that the purchaser
paid too much for the land and, since the excess value resulted from an
error, it is simply added to the basis of the land.33
V. AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CASES INVOLVING ACQUISITIONS
FROM A GROUND LESSOR
A. Mistake in Valuation and Failure To Carry the Burden of Proof
While there have been a number of cases in the Tax Court, district
courts, circuit courts of appeal, and at least one case in the Supreme
Court dealing with acquisitions from a ground lessor, several of these
cases establish questionable precedents. Some of the cases, when properly
analyzed, do not actually address the problem.34 Other cases that do address the problem do not contribute to its resolution because the taxpayer
failed to prove the existence of an interest beyond the interest in land acquired from the ground lessor.35
A number of cases arise from a mistake in the valuation of the ground lessor’s interest for estate tax purposes.36 In some cases, the value of a lesseeconstructed improvement, which had no “security value” and in which the
decedent ground lessor had no reversionary interest, was included in the
ground lessor’s estate.37 Typically, in these cases, the value of a lessee31. See, e.g., Geneva Drive-In Theatre, 67 T.C. at 764; Schubert, 33 T.C. at 1048;
Quilliam, supra note 15, at 284; Rollyson, supra note 17, at 365; Maryland Note, supra note
15, at 357; Michigan Note, supra note 15, at 586; Utah Note, supra note 15, at 131; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 486-87.
32. See, e.g., Midler Court Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 590 (1974), aff’d,
521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975); Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954), aff’d, 230
F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1956); Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945); May v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 733 (1944); Annex Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 167
(1943); Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 493.
33. See, e.g., Moore, 207 F.2d at 265; Wisconsin Note, supra note 15, at 489, 491.
34. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
37. See, e.g., Buzzell v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 825 (1st Cir 1964); Barnes v. United
States, 222 F. Supp. 960 (D. Mass. 1963), aff’d sub nom. Buzzell v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d
825 (1st Cir. 9164); Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff’d, 266
F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959); Bueltermann v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Mo. 1945),
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constructed improvement was included in the lessor’s estate because the
ground lessor had title to both the land and the improvement.38
One would expect a purchaser from a ground lessor not to allocate any
part of the purchase price to a lessee-constructed improvement when the
term of the lease is longer than the economic life of the improvement and
the improvement does not appear to provide any “security value.” There
are, however, several cases in which a part of the purchase price was so
allocated.39 In several cases, the taxpayers recognized the error in allocating part of the purchase price to the lessee-constructed improvement and
argued that they had actually acquired the “security value” of the improvement or the ground lessor’s interest in a premium lease.40
While these cases discuss the possibility of the acquisition from the
ground lessor of interests other than the interest in land, they constitute
doubtful precedents. With the exception of World Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner,41 all that was actually acquired from the ground lessor in
any of these cases was the interest in land and, probably, an essentially
valueless reversionary interest in the improvement.42
In a number of cases, the proponent of the acquisition from the ground
lessor of an interest in addition to the land failed to carry the burden of
proof in showing that the additional interest existed.43 All of these cases
involve the alleged acquisition of premium rentals and the amortization of
the value or acquisition cost over the remaining term of the ground
lease.44
The courts agree on the facts that the taxpayer must prove to show the
existence of an additional interest. For example, the Tax Court in May v.
rev’d, 155 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1946); Currier v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 488 (1968); Rowan,
22 T.C. at 865; Pearson v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 851 (1949), rev’d, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.
1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Currier v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
38. See, e.g., Buzzell, 326 F.2d at 825; Goelet, 161 F. Supp. at 305; Pearson, 13 T.C. at
851.
39. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Mass.
1970), aff’d, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970); Fieland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 743 (1980).
40. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr., 310 F. Supp. at 1313; World Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, 35 T.C. 7 (1960), rev’d, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962). The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed the Tax Court in World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner and, apparently, permitted the purchaser to depreciate the improvement. While depreciating the improvement was the wrong answer, the right answer might have allowed the purchaser to depreciate or amortize the amount that had been allocated to the improvement partly as the cost
of the “security value” of the improvement and partly as a payment for premium rentals.
41. 35 T.C. 7 (1960), rev’d, 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
42. See, e.g., Buzzell v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1964); M. DeMatteo
Constr., 310 F. Supp. at 1313; Barnes v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 960 (Mass. 1963), aff’d
sub nom. Buzzell v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1964); Fieland, 73 T.C. at 743;
Currier v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 488 (1968); Rowan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 865 (1954);
Pearson v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 851 (1949), rev’d, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Currier v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
43. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
44. See infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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Commissioner45 described the facts that must be established by the taxpayer:
The independent value of a leasehold, to a lessor, at any given time,
is the present worth of the excess of the rentals payable during the remaining term of the lease over the present worth of the rentals that
might be obtained under a similar new lease for a like period. That is
to say, the value of a lease is its bonus value.
The value, if any, of the leasehold in question in the hands of the . .
. [taxpayer], independently of the land, was not the capitalized value of
the rentals to be received, but was the capitalized value of such rentals
over the capitalized value of the rentals that might have been obtained
under a new lease of like kind. The evidence affords no basis for determining that nor does it indicate that there was any such value.46

In reaching a determination that the taxpayer failed to satisfy the burden
of proof, courts are strongly influenced by the taxpayer’s failure to show
that the claimed interest was separately valued in the decedent ground lessor’s estate, or that the claimed interest was acquired separately from the
land and that the purchase price was partially allocated to it.47
A number of courts have imposed additional burdens on the taxpayer.
If the taxpayer claimed an interest in premium rents, the taxpayer was
obligated to demonstrate both that the excess rent over the fair rental
value was not consideration for an option to renew the lease, an option to
purchase the land, or part of the purchase price of the land, and that it
was not made up for by below-market rents in renewal terms of the
lease.48
Finally, the decisions in Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner49 and Millinery Center Building Corp. v. Commissioner50 present an
interesting contrast in the treatment of the taxpayer’s burden of proof and
represent a significant affirmative step in the treatment of an interest in
premium rents as a separate interest that can be acquired from a ground
lessor. Both cases involved situations in which the lessee, who had constructed a building on the leased land, purchased title to the land from the
lessor in order to avoid paying a higher-than-fair-market rent for the land.
In each case, the lessee, after completing the purchase, attempted to allo45. 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 733 (1944).
46. Id. at 738 (citations omitted).
47. See, e.g., Midler Court Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 590 (1974), aff’d,
521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975); Bernstein v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1146 (1954), aff’d, 230
F.2d 603 (2nd Cir. 1956); Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.M. (CCH)
498 (1947), rev’d, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948); Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1236
(1945); Annex Corp. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 167 (1943).
48. See, e.g., Fieland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 743 (1980); Midler Court Realty, 61
T.C. at 590.
49. 6 T.C.M. (CCH) 498 (1947), rev’d, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948).
50. 21 T.C. 817 (1954), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 820 (1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 456 (1956).

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

874

[Vol. 23:863

cate part of the purchase price to the acquisition of relief from the high
rent.
The Tax Court, in Cleveland Allerton Hotel, refused to permit the allocation because it was not made at the time of the sale and the transaction did not provide for the separate acquisition of the leasehold estate.51
The Tax Court was reversed by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals:
[The taxpayer] could not, it says, have merely secured escape from a
burdensome lease and . . . [left] the premises because it owned a valuable
building thereon. It had no need for the fee simple title because it already
had full possession and use of the land by the provisions of the lease for
its unexpired term. Uncontradicted testimony supports the petitioner’s assertion of its purpose and the necessity for buying the land . . . .52

The Supreme Court, however, in Millinery Center Building, refused to
permit a similarly situated taxpayer to treat part of the purchase price as the
consideration for freedom from the lease.53 The Court stated:
Petitioner introduced evidence to show that the rent it was paying under the lease was greatly in excess of the fair rental value of the land as
vacant, unimproved land. Petitioner contends that it already owned the
building and that therefore the purchase agreement was entered into for
the purpose of avoiding the excessive rentals of the lease. . . . Petitioner’s claim that it “owned” the building is based on a loose and misleading use of “owned.” . . . It could make use of the building for the
remainder of its economic life, but only on payment of the stated rent.
Petitioner’s evidence with respect to the rental value of the land as unimproved is irrelevant. It was using the land as improved by the building; it
was paying rent for the land as improved by the building. Petitioner tendered no evidence that it was paying excessive rent for what it was actually leasing.54

One might question the analysis of the Supreme Court. When the taxpayer claimed it “owned” the building, it really was saying that it had constructed the building, made the investment in the building, and that the lessor had no investment in the building. As a result, the lessor was not entitled to a return from the building. The lessor’s sole investment was in the
land, and the lessor obtained its return from the land through the rent paid
pursuant to the ground lease. Therefore, the lessee’s evidence showing that
the rent it was paying under the ground lease was greatly in excess of the
fair rental value of the land as vacant, unimproved land was entirely relevant with respect to the matter being litigated.
The cases involving the taxpayer’s failure to carry the burden of proof,
as well as the cases involving an error in the determination of the estate
51.
52.
53.
54.

6 T.C.M. (CCH) at 498.
Cleveland Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 806, 806 (6th Cir. 1948).
350 U.S. 456, 461 (1956).
Id. at 495-96.
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tax value or the purchase price, are of questionable value in determining
whether interests other than an interest in land can be acquired from a
ground lessor. A number of the cases, however, suggest that had the taxpayer satisfied the burden of proof, the court would have found that an
interest in addition to that in the land itself had been acquired.55 In addition, although its impact is leavened by a bit of doubt arising from the
Supreme Court’s decision in Millinery Center Building,56 the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Cleveland Allerton Hotel held that a lessee acquiring
the ground lessor’s interest can, upon appropriate proof, deduct the cost
of getting out of a burdensome ground lease.57 If a lessee, acquiring the
lessor’s interest, can deduct the cost of getting out of a burdensome lease,
certainly a taxpayer ought to be able to amortize the cost of acquiring a
beneficial lease.
B. Acquisition of the Ground Lessor’s Residuary Interest in an
Improvement
If a purchaser acquires, or an heir inherits, the residuary interest of the
ground lessor in an improvement constructed by the lessee, the purchaser,58 or the heir59 can claim a basis in the acquired residuary interest
apart from the interest in the land.60 While there have been assertions that
the heir’s basis, acquired pursuant to section 1014 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended, may be used solely for determining gain and
loss,61 the acquired basis can be depreciated.62 The question is when depreciation can be claimed. Since the purchaser’s or heir’s basis in the residuary interest in the improvement is not subject to exhaustion and is not
used in the trade or business of, or the production of income for, the purchaser or heir until the end of the term of the ground lease, depreciation
cannot be claimed until the termination of the ground lease.63 Following
the termination of the ground lease, the heir or purchaser may depreciate
the basis acquired in the residuary interest.64
55. See, e.g., Fieland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 743 (1980); Peters v. Commissioner, 4
T.C. 1236 (1945); May v. Commissioner, 3 T.C.M. (CCH) 733 (1944).
56. 350 U.S. 456, 461 (1956).
57. 166 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1948).
58. See Rev. Rul. 60-180, 1960-1 C.B. 114; Millinery Ctr. Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955), aff’d, 350 U.S. 456 (1956).
59. See Williams v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 1099 (1962); Schubert v. Commissioner, 33
T.C. 1048 (1960), aff’d, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961).
60. See infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
61. See Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff’d, 266 F.2d 881
(2nd Cir. 1959).
62. See Williams, 37 T.C. at 1099; Schubert, 33 T.C. at 1048.
63. See Goelet, 161 F. Supp. at 305; Williams, 37 T.C. at 1099; Schubert, 33 T.C. at
1048.
64. See Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 770 (1977), aff’d,
622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980); Williams, 37 T.C. at 1099; Schubert, 33 T.C. at 1048.
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Two issues are generally present in cases dealing with the allocation of
the purchase price, or the allocation of value for estate tax purposes, to
the lessor’s residuary interest in the improvement. The first is whether the
economic life of the lessee-constructed improvement is greater than the
term of the lease, and the second is whether the purchaser or heir can depreciate the interest prior to the termination of the ground lease.65
Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner66 provides a good example of an appropriate analysis of the acquisition of a lessor’s residuary
interest in a lessee-constructed improvement. First, it was demonstrated
that the economic life of the improvement was greater than the term of the
ground lease. The Tax Court stated that “[p]etitioners acquired . . . the
right to have the land and theater improvements revert to them, as provided in the lease, upon its termination;”67 this statement implied that the
improvement would have some economic life remaining upon reversion.
The taxpayers attempted to depreciate the residuary interest prior to the
termination of the lease. In denying the depreciation, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reasoned that
[p]rior to termination of the lease, the taxpayers did not hold the improvements for the production of income. . . . Second, the taxpayers’
investment in the improvements did not erode prior [to the termination
of the lease]. They did not suffer economic loss from obsolescence or
use, and so did not qualify for the deduction.68

Once the lease terminated, however, and
the theater improvements reverted to [the taxpayers], their interest ripened into a depreciable one. They then became entitled to annual depreciation deductions in such amounts as to enable them to recover
over the improvements’ remaining useful lives the $200,000 of the
purchase price allocable to [the residuary interest].69

Thus, one interest that can be acquired from a ground lessor, in addition to the land, is the ground lessor's residuary interest, if any, in lesseeconstructed improvements. The basis in this interest, however, cannot be
depreciated until the ground lease ends.

65. See, e.g., Geneva Drive-In Theatre, 67 T.C. at 764; Williams, 37 T.C. at 1099;
Schubert, 33 T.C. at 1048.
66. 67 T.C. at 764.
67. Id. at 770.
68. Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 622 F.2d 995, 996 (9th Cir. 1980).
69. 67 T.C. at 771-72.
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C. Acquisition from a Ground Lessor of a Currently Depreciable Interest
in Lessee-Constructed Improvements
1. In General
Generally, the heir of, or a purchaser from, a ground lessor cannot acquire a currently depreciable interest in a lessee-constructed improvement. An exception to this rule occurs when a recently constructed substantial improvement serves as a form of security for the lessee’s performance of the ground lease or can be used as security for a loan to be
made to the ground lessor.70 It is sometimes said that the presence of the
improvement simply makes the lease more valuable. The improvement,
however, inhibits the lessee’s breach of the lease, makes the premises
easier to lease on termination of the ground lease, and may serve as security for a loan to the lessor. Therefore, for the ground lessor, the improvement has a “security value” that the heir or the purchaser can acquire.71
The Tax Court resolved in favor of the taxpayers the first three cases
to question whether an heir or purchaser could acquire a currently depreciable interest in a lessee-constructed improvement.72 In each of these
cases, the improvement’s economic life was less than the term of the
lease, the improvement had been constructed well before the taxpayer’s
acquisition, and the improvement had no security value.73 It appears,
however, that the improvement may have been valued in the estate of the
decedent lessor.74
In short order, the Tax Court was reversed by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals, in Commissioner v. Pearson,75 and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Moore v. Commissioner.76 Subsequently, the Tax Court, in
Rowan v. Commissioner,77 reached the conclusion that the Fifth Circuit
and the Ninth Circuit were correct in their views of this issue. Following
Rowan, the courts consistently denied the heir or purchaser a currently
depreciable interest in a lessee-constructed improvement when the im70. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; infra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
71. Another possible item of value to the ground lessor, and one that a purchaser or heir
might acquire, is the value associated with a desirable and creditworthy tenant. This item
standing alone, however, should not have a great impact on the purchase price or estate tax
value. Therefore, this value is primarily helpful in demonstrating that premium rentals, or an
interest in a lessee-constructed improvement having security value, have been acquired.
72. See Moore v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 906 (1950), rev’d, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.
1953), reh’g granted, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 869 (1955); Pearson v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 851
(1949), rev’d, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951); Currier v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
73. See supra note 72.
74. See supra note 72.
75. 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951).
76. 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953).
77. 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
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provement had no security value.78 This trend persisted until the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner.79
While the courts, with the exception of the Eighth Circuit, uniformly
chose to deny the heir or the purchaser a currently depreciable interest,
the reasons for the denials were many and varied. Some courts distinguished between an heir and a purchaser and found that an heir, unlike a
purchaser, does not acquire a depreciable interest or, put affirmatively,
acquires an unchanging basis.80 This analysis is faulty. The courts recognized early that there was no distinction between the basis, and the use of
the basis, of an heir vis-à-vis a purchaser.81
Other courts reasoned that if a decedent or a seller-lessor does not
have an interest that can be depreciated, an heir or purchaser from such a
lessor cannot acquire one.82 This analysis also is faulty unless what is
meant is that an interest having no value to a ground lessor has no value
to an heir of, or a purchaser from, the ground lessor. As stated by the
court in Pearson:
[T]here is no necessary inconsistency in the holding that, though an ancestor, lessor, having no cost basis, does not have a depreciable interest in a building erected by a lessee, an heir may, as an incidence of
estate taxation, and, under [Section 1014] I.R.C., have a basis for depreciation and an interest to depreciate.83

It has been suggested that “[a] construction of the law to permit not only
the lessee (who has a real economic interest) but also [a purchaser or heir] to
take depreciation on the same building would be somewhat anomalous.”84
This result, however, would be no more anomalous than permitting each of
two co-tenants, who both provide funds to construct a real estate improvement, to depreciate the same improvement, or permitting a lessee, who finishes out rough space, to depreciate the lessee’s cost of the improvement
while the lessor is depreciating the cost of the improvement incurred by the
lessor.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 80-88.
79. 299 F.2d 614 (8th Cir. 1962).
80. See, e.g., Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff’d, 266
F.2d 881 (2nd Cir. 1959); First National Bank of Kansas City v. Nee, 85 F. Supp. 840 (W.D.
Mo. 1949), motion for new trial, 92 F. Supp. 328 (W.D.Mo. 1950), aff’d, 190 F.2d 61 (8th
Cir. 1951); Bueltermann v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Mo. 1945), rev’d, 155 F.2d
597 (8th Cir. 1946); Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939), aff’d, 119 F.2d 959 (7th
Cir. 1941).
81. Moore v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 265, 274-75 (9th Cir. 1953).
82. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1313 (D. Mass.
1970), aff’d, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970); Currier v. Commissioner, 51 T.C. 488 (1968);
Schubert v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960), aff’d, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961).
83. 188 F.2d 72, 74 (5th Cir. 1951), rev’g 13 T.C. 851 (1949).
84. Moore, 207 F.2d at 272.
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It is properly asserted that a purchaser or heir cannot depreciate a lessee-constructed improvement when that improvement is not currently used
in the trade or business of, or for the production of income by, the heir or
purchaser and when the interest in the improvement is not subject to the
loss of value during the term of the ground lease.85 This analysis is applicable if the heir or purchaser acquires only a residuary interest in the improvement from the ground lessor, but it would not be applicable if the
security value of the improvement is also acquired, since the security
value is subject to exhaustion during the term of the lease.86
Finally, some courts properly point out that if the lessee-constructed
improvement is subject to a ground lease with a term longer than the economic life of the improvement and the improvement has no security
value, the improvement has no value to the ground lessor and, as a result,
no value to a purchaser from, or heir of, the ground lessor.87 The Tax
Court, in Rowan, described the heir’s position in the following terms:
[I]n situations such as we have here where the term of the lease extended beyond the useful life of the building and where the taxpayer
would not sustain any economic loss as the building wore out and could
not sell her interest in the building apart from the land or the rentals,
the value of her interest in the building was zero and she could not take
depreciation on the building.88

In general, therefore, a purchaser from, or an heir of, a ground lessor
can acquire a depreciable interest in a lessee-constructed improvement
only under two circumstances: when the term of the ground lease is
shorter than the economic life of the lessee-constructed improvement, or
when a recent improvement acts as security for the lessee’s performance
of its obligations under the lease or for a loan to the ground lessor. The
Eighth Circuit in World Publishing, however, held that a purchaser from
a ground lessor acquired a depreciable interest in a lessee-constructed improvement even though it appeared that the term of the ground lease was
longer than the life of the improvement and the improvement might have
had no security value.89 Some courts have indicated their belief that the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is simply wrong.90 Other courts have in85. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 55-89, 1955-1 C.B. 284; First National Bank of Kansas City v.
Nee, 190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951); Goelet v. United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), aff’d, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1959); Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner,
67 T.C. 764 (1977), aff’d, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980).
86. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text; infra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text.
87. See, e.g., Moore v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 265, 265 (9th Cir. 1953), reh’g
granted, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 869 (1955); Commissioner v. Pearson, 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir.
1951); Rowan v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
88. 22 T.C. at 873.
89. 299 F.2d 614, 623 (8th Cir. 1962), rev’g 35 T.C. 7 (1960).
90. See, e.g., M. DeMatteo Constr. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1263 (1st Cir. 1970).
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dicated that the Eighth Circuit reached the right result because the court
was really dealing with premium rentals and, therefore, could permit the
amortization of the purchaser’s cost of the premium rentals over the remaining term of the lease.91
The World Publishing court explained why it believed that the purchaser was currently entitled to depreciate an interest in a lesseeconstructed improvement:
A. The taxpayer-purchaser by his purchase of the property has
made an investment. He is not concerned with the identity, as between
his vendor-lessor and the tenant, of the builder of the building. From
this point of view, if he is entitled to the deduction where his vendorlessor was the builder, he is entitled to a deduction where the tenant
was the builder.
B. To allow the purchaser to depreciate in one situation and to
deny him depreciation in the other, especially where, as here, title to
the building is in the lessor and then in the purchaser, seems to be illogical, to emphasize a historical fact not participated in or caused by
the purchaser and not of any other considered economic consequence to
him, and to exalt form over substance.
C. It is no answer to say that the lease rentals . . . constitute only
ground rent. We are concerned here not with depreciation of rentals,
but with depreciation of a portion of this taxpayer’s investment in the
income producing property he purchased.92

The reasoning of the court is faulty. When a purchaser or heir steps into the
shoes of the ground lessor, the purchaser’s or heir’s return from the property is derived through the ground lease. The rents paid pursuant to the
ground lease are solely a return on the ground lessor’s interest in the land,
which is the only investment of the ground lessor. If the term of the ground
lease is longer than the remaining economic life of the lessee-constructed
improvement and the improvement has no security value, the value of the
improvement to the lessor must be zero. On the other hand, when the
ground lessor constructs the improvement, the ground lessor has made an
investment in the improvement and, presumably, it is of value to the ground
lessor. This interest of the ground lessor in the improvement is part of what
the purchaser or heir acquires. It is far from illogical to permit the purchaser or heir to depreciate an interest in an improvement when the interest
was purchased from a lessor who constructed the improvement and to
whom the improvement had value, and to deny depreciation when the purchaser or heir could not acquire a valuable interest in a lessee-constructed
improvement because the improvement had no value to the ground lessor.
91. See, e.g., Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764 (1977),
aff’d, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980).
92. 299 F.2d at 621-22.
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2. Can a Currently Depreciable Interest in a Lessee-Constructed
Improvement Ever Be Acquired from a Ground Lessor?
If the ground lessor has a valuable interest in the lessee-constructed
improvement, a purchaser or an heir can acquire that interest. A ground
lessor may have a valuable interest in a lessee-constructed improvement
when the improvement acts as security for the lessee’s performance of the
ground lease or improves the lessor’s ability to lease the land if the
ground lease is terminated.93 While the improvement actually makes the
ground lease and land more valuable, the value derived is dependent on,
and is lost with, the aging of the lessee-constructed improvement. Therefore, it can be said that the lessor has a valuable interest in the lesseeconstructed improvement—an interest that a purchaser or heir can acquire.
The security value of the lessee-constructed improvement is not affected by whether the lessee financed the construction of the improvement
if the lessee is personally liable for the financing. If, however, the construction of the improvement is highly leveraged and the lessee is not personally liable, the value to the lessor is substantially less since the lessee
may have little or nothing at stake in whether it loses the improvement.
Even if the lessee has a substantial amount at stake (through investment in
the improvement or personal liability for the financing), the value of this
interest to the ground lessor will decrease as the improvement ages. The
lessee, presumably, will recover the investment and a reasonable return
on that investment from the use of the improvement as it ages.
The ground lessor also has a valuable interest in a lessee-constructed
improvement if the ground lessor can use the improvement as security for
its own borrowings. The use of the improvement as security can result in
the lessor’s being able to borrow more money or secure a lower interest
rate on a secured loan. It is probably the rare case in which a ground lessor can use a lessee-constructed improvement as security for a loan. The
lessor may not acquire title to the improvement until termination of the
lease and, in most cases, the construction of the improvement will be financed by the lessee using the improvement as security for the financing.
As a result, there will be a first mortgage on the improvement and the
ground lessor’s ability to use the improvement as security for borrowing
will be limited, if not nonexistent. The value to the ground lessor of the
right to use the improvement as security for a loan will increase as any
lessee-incurred financing secured by the improvement is paid off. On the
other hand, as the improvement grows older, the value to the lessor of the
right to pledge the improvement as security for a loan diminishes.
The security value of a lessee-constructed improvement, as the concept
has been used in this Article, has been defined as one or a combination of
93. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; infra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
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the following: (1) the lessor’s ability to use the improvement as security
for a loan; (2) the use of the improvement as security for the ground lessee’s performance of the ground lease; or (3) the presence of the improvement in facilitating the ground lessor’s leasing of the property on
termination of the lease.94 Do any or all of these interests rise to the level
of a currently depreciable interest in the improvement in the hands of a
purchaser from, or an heir of, the ground lessor?
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion in World Publishing is
useful in addressing the lessor’s use of an improvement as security for a
loan made to the lessor. As will be remembered from the prior discussion
of this case, the Eighth Circuit held that the taxpayer had a currently depreciable interest in lessee-constructed improvements.95 The decision has
been criticized in this Article96 and by the First Circuit Court of Appeals
in M. DeMatteo Construction Co. v. United States.97 In addition, the Tax
Court suggested in Geneva Drive-In Theatre that the Eighth Circuit in
World Publishing, had really held that the $300,000 of the purchase price
that the taxpayer was permitted to amortize was a payment for premium
rentals.98 This position does not appear to offer a satisfactory explanation
of the case since the Eighth Circuit did consider the premium rentals argument and had dismissed it by stating that “it [was] not particularly
urged by the taxpayer on [the] appeal.”99
It is clear, however, that in World Publishing, the lessor could have
used the lessee-constructed improvement as security for a loan to the
ground lessor and that, in the event such a loan had been made, the mortgage securing the loan would have had priority over the lease.100 This
valuable interest, possibly in conjunction with other elements of security
value in the improvement and the premium rentals, would logically explain the court’s decision in World Publishing.101 If this interpretation is
correct, then at least one court has recognized as a valuable interest the
right of the lessor to use a lessee-constructed improvement as security for
a loan. This right can be purchased and inherited and, therefore, can result in a currently depreciable interest in the improvement in the hands of
the purchaser or heir.
The security value of a lessee-constructed improvement, other than its
value as security for a loan to the lessor, has been recognized by a number of
courts as a valuable interest of the ground lessor. For example, in determining the value of a ground lease, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
299 F.2d at 622.
See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
433 F.2d 1263, 1265 (1st Cir 1970).
Geneva Drive-In Theatre, 67 T.C. at 773.
299 F.2d at 620.
Id. at 617.
See id. at 614.
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1220 Realty Co. v. Commissioner,102 set out with approval the following
testimony of an appraiser:
[T]he land is worth around $700,000.00, and that $41,000.00 a year
ground rental would be equal to around 5.8% [o]n the $700,000.00.
And, as of 1952 or 1953, . . . a ground rental of that type would have
been listed lower if it had been secured by a building, a good building.103

In Cleveland Allerton Hotel, a lessee chose to buy the ground lessor’s
interest rather than buy its way out of a ground lease.104 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals impliedly recognized the value of a lessee-constructed
improvement that secured the lessee’s performance of the ground lease in
describing the position of the lessee in the following manner:
It could not, it says, have merely secured escape from a burdensome
lease and [left] the premises because it owned a valuable building
thereon . . . . The lease was a liability which it sought to extinguish. It
was impossible to do merely by buying acquittance and giving up possession of the premises. It had thereupon a valuable hotel building
which it could not take away with it.105

While the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in First National Bank of
Kansas City v. Nee,106 did not permit the heir of the ground lessor to depreciate currently the lessee-constructed improvement, it did recognize
the value of the lessee-constructed improvement to the ground lessor. The
court stated: “It [the lessee-constructed improvement] stands primarily as
security for the lessee’s performance of its covenants; therefore, belongs
to the lessee subject to that pledge.”107 Finally, in Geneva Drive-In Theatre, the Tax Court, while finding against the purchaser’s claim to current
depreciation on the facts of this case, indicated that it might have reached
a different decision on different facts:
There may be situations where lessee-constructed improvements enhance the value of real property acquired subject to a lease. Such improvements, for example, may provide added assurance that the land
rent to which the purchaser becomes entitled will be collectible. In that
sense the deterioration or obsolescence of the improvements prior to
the expiration of the lease may tend to cause the purchaser’s investment
to depreciate.108

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

322 F.2d 495 (6th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 497.
166 F.2d 805, 807 (6th Cir. 1948).
Id. at 806.
190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951).
Id. at 71.
67 T.C. 764, 772 (1977), aff’d, 622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980).
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Once it has been determined that the purchaser or heir has acquired a
present interest in the lessee-constructed improvement through the acquisition of the security value, it must be determined whether the purchaser or heir can depreciate the “cost” of that interest. In order to depreciate the interest, the purchaser or heir must use the interest in trade or
business or for the production of income and the investment in the interest
must erode over time.109 The purchaser’s or heir’s investment in the security value of the lessee-constructed improvement will erode over time.
As the improvement ages, its value as “security” will go down and the
purchaser or heir will suffer an economic loss. Whether this interest is
used in trade or business or for the production of income is a more difficult question. Since the used-in-trade-or-business test can be met by devoting the interest to trade or business,110 and an interest does not have to
produce income in order to be devoted to use in trade or business,111 the
use of the lessee-constructed improvement as security for the lessee’s performance of the ground lease should qualify as being used in trade or
business. It is more difficult to argue that the availability of the lesseeconstructed improvement as security for a loan to the ground lessor
amounts to being devoted to use in trade or business. Use in trade or
business, however, includes interests that are available but not yet actually used in trade or business.112 Therefore, the purchaser and the heir
should be able to meet the requirements for current depreciation of the security value of the lessee-constructed improvement.
D. Acquisition from a Ground Lessor of an Interest in Premium Rents—
The Advantageous Aspects of the Ground Lease
If the rent paid pursuant to a ground lease is greater than the rent that
could be obtained from the land unencumbered by the ground lease, the
ground lessor possesses a valuable interest in the ground lease in addition
to the lessor’s interest in the land. This interest is derived from the advantageous portions of the ground lease, particularly the rental, and is independent of the land subject to the ground lease.113 The value is not inherent in the land but, instead, is derived through the ground lease.
While there have been few decisions that have expressly permitted a
purchaser from, or an heir of, a ground lessor to claim a basis in the lease
109. 622 F.2d at 996.
110. See, e.g., P. Dougherty Co. v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1946); Alamo
Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 534 (1950).
111. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Smith, 397 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1968).
112. See P. Dougherty Co., 159 F.2d at 269. If the ground lessor borrowed funds against
the security of the lessee-constructed improvement and used those funds in the operation of the
real estate, the use-in-trade-or-business test presumably would be met.
113. Another potentially advantageous and significant aspect of the ground lease involves
the lessee. The desirability and creditworthiness of the lessee may represent a valuable interest
of the ground lessor—an interest that can be purchased or inherited.
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as a result of premium rents and amortize that basis over the term of the
ground lease, a number of courts have recognized the concept of premium
rents. For example, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Midler Court
Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner,114 defined the concept of premium rent in
the following terms:
For purposes of discussion, we shall treat two possible definitions of
“premium” rentals whose applicability might be proven in a case such
as this one:
1)The amount, determined as of the dates the . . . leases were executed, by which the rent provided under the leases exceeded the rent
which could have been obtained in the open market under similar
leases.
2)The amount by which the rent provided under the leases in fact exceeded the fair rental value of the premises over the unexpired lease
terms, determined at the time . . . the property [was purchased or inherited] subject to the leaseholds. . . . The existence of “premium”
rentals along the lines of the first definition is inherently suspect in an
arm’s length transaction, especially in a transaction involving substantial rentals payable over a long period of time.
...
The second possible definition of “premium” rent is similar to the
first, except that the appropriateness of the rent specified in the lease is
evaluated as of the date on which the purchaser [or heir] acquires the
fee subject to a leasehold. “Premium” rent under this definition is the
amount by which the fair rental value of the premises at the time the
lease was executed exceeds the fair rental value over the remaining
term of the lease. Thus, in the present case, the “premium” represents
a decrease in the fair rental value of the leased premises between the
execution dates of the leases and the date of purchase [or death of the
ground lessor] . . . .115

The amount paid for, or the value of, the premium rents (the amount
of rent in excess of the rent that, at the time of acquisition, could be derived from the unencumbered land) will constitute the purchaser’s, or the
heir’s, basis in the ground lease. This amount has not been paid for the
land and is not part of the value of the land since the inherent value of the
land is its unencumbered value. It is only when the ground lease is combined with the land that the value of the premium rents is present. The
purchaser, or the heir, uses the lease in trade or business, or for the production of income, and the advantageous portions of the lease will be exhausted on termination of the lease. Therefore, at a minimum, the purchaser or heir should be entitled to amortize the basis in the lease over the
term of the lease. Looking again to the opinion of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Midler Court Realty:
114. 521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975).
115. Id. at 769.
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[The purchaser] contends that a portion of the purchase price paid to
the . . . [ground lessor] for the fee is attributable to the right to receive
rent in excess of the amount for which . . . [the purchaser] could have
leased the premises on the date of purchase. It claims that the fee, as
encumbered by favorable leases, cost it more than the unencumbered
fee would have, and that therefore it should be entitled, for purposes of
reporting its taxable income, to offset its investment in the “premium”
rentals against the “premium” rent income. This would permit [the
purchaser] to amortize its cost of receiving “premium” rentals over the
terms of the leases under which the “premium” rentals are due.116

The Midler Court Realty court, however, did not permit the purchaser
to claim a basis in the advantageous leases and to amortize this basis over
the term of the leases.117 The court rested its refusal on a finding that the
taxpayer had not met its burden of proving that premium rents were present.118
In Moore v. Commissioner,119 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reached a different conclusion. The Moore court found that the taxpayer,
who was the heir of a ground lessor, had demonstrated that the rents received under a ground lease at the time of the heir’s acquisition of the
property were greater than the rents that might have been obtained for the
unencumbered land at the time of acquisition and were not offset by any
other terms of the lease. The court determined that the application of section 1014 resulted in a basis to the heir in the premium rentals (the ground
lease) equal to the value of those premium rentals at the time of the death of
the ground lessor.120 In addition, the court determined that the favorable aspects of the ground lease were used in the trade or business of, or for the
production of income by, the heir.121 Finally, the court held that if the heir’s
interest in the premium rentals were exhausted over time, the heir’s basis in
the premium rentals could be amortized under regulation 1.167(a)-3.122
Regulation 1.167(a)-3 permits the depreciation or amortization of an
intangible asset if it is known from experience or other factors to be of
use in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. The
116. Id. at 769-70.
117. Id. at 770.
118. Id. The taxpayer failed to demonstrate that rent payments, which were higher than the
rent that could be obtained for the land at the time of acquisition (1) were not made up for by
lower rentals during the renewal terms of the lease; (2) were not consideration for the options
to renew and to purchase; and (3) were not part of the purchase price if the lessee exercised
the option to purchase. Id. The Tax Court, in Fieland, also used these considerations to hold
that the purchaser had failed to demonstrate the presence of premium rentals. See also Turner
Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2692 (1995).
119. 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
120. Id. at 274-75.
121. Id. at 274.
122. Id. at 277.
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Ninth Circuit remanded Moore to the Tax Court for a determination of
whether the premium rentals were subject to exhaustion.123 The Ninth Circuit felt, erroneously, that if the land subject to the ground lease could be
rented after termination of the ground lease at rents equal to, or higher
than, the rents provided under the ground lease, then the heir’s interest in
the premium rentals was not subject to exhaustion.124 The position of the
Ninth Circuit was shared by other courts. For example, in Schubert v.
Commissioner,125 the Fourth Circuit indicated that
to the extent of these excess or premium rentals . . . [the taxpayer] has
acquired, and is holding, as capital or principal, for the production of
income, an asset wasting by lapse of time since, upon and after the
termination of the lease, the land will yield only its lesser fair rental
value; and at that time the premium rentals will have been exhausted
and will vanish.126

In addition, the United States Board of Tax Appeals (now the Tax Court),
in Friend v. Commissioner,127 denied a taxpayer amortization with respect
to the cost of the alleged premium rents; the court stated that “[t]here is
no showing that the rental value of the premises at the expiration of the
leases will be any less than it was upon the dates of the execution of the
leases.”128
On remand from the Ninth Circuit, the Tax Court in Moore permitted
both parties to introduce evidence of the rental value of the land upon
termination of the ground lease in 2023.129 Although none of the expert
witnesses could estimate the rental value of the land in 2023, or even in
1975 or 1960,130 the court held that the taxpayer could amortize the basis
in her interest in the premium rentals.131 The Tax Court justified its conclusion by noting that the taxpayer, as the heir of the ground lessor, acquired the premium rent required by the ground lease.132 This interest had
to be exhausted by the time of the termination of the lease regardless of
whether the land subject to the ground lease subsequently could be rented
for the same rent, or even a higher rent.133 The Tax Court stated:
In addition to the land, what the petitioner must be regarded as having
purchased, and did in fact acquire . . .[,] was a contract calling for the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961), aff’g 33 T.C. 1048, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961).
126. Id. at 580.
127. 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939), aff’d, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
673 (1941).
128. Id. at 771-72.
129. 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 869, 872 (1955).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 873.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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payment of fixed rentals above the then current rental value of the
property for a period of years extending to the year 2023. The contract
is a depreciable capital asset having a limited and determinable existence. Exhaustion of her rights under the lease will be complete in the
year 2023 because, in that year, her right to the rentals fixed by the
lease will terminate. Fluctuation in the rental value of the property
during the term of the lease and the rental obtainable thereafter have no
relation to the rights acquired by a purchaser of the lease. The . . .
price paid for the premium value should properly be amortizable to
permit petitioner to recover the “cost of her investments” without being
taxed thereon. . . . The purchaser of the lease is not required to show
that it cannot be renewed on as favorable terms upon its termination,
since the amount paid for this lease was meant to secure a favorable
rental for a determinate period of time; hence, it is amortizable during
this period of time.134

The Tax Court’s holding on remand of Moore is the only decision that
clearly grants to the party acquiring the ground lessor’s interest in premium rentals the ability to amortize the interest over the term of the
lease.135 This concept, however, has been viewed favorably by a number
of courts. For example, in both Midler Court Realty136 and Fieland v.
Commissioner,137 the courts indicated that, had the taxpayers been able to
prove the existence of premium rentals, the courts might have recognized
that the interest in premium rentals could be acquired, a basis therein established, and, upon a demonstration that the interest was subject to exhaustion, the court might have recognized that the basis could be amortized over the term of the lease.138 Both the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Schubert, and the First Circuit Court of Appeals, in M. DeMatteo Construction, affirmatively recognized the existence of the premium
rental concept.139 Finally, as interpreted by the Tax Court in Geneva
Drive-In Theatre, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in World Publishing not only accepted the premium rental concept but, in fact, permitted
the taxpayer to amortize its basis in the interest in premium rents acquired
from the ground lessor.140 The Tax Court, considering in Geneva Drive-In
Theatre the Eighth Circuit’s decision in World Publishing, stated:
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. 61 T.C. 590 (1974), aff'd, 521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975).
137. 73 T.C. 743 (1980).
138. Midler Court Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 767, 769-70 (3d Cir. 1975);
Fieland, 73 T.C. at 755-56. In addition, in Turner Outdoor Advertising, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2692 (1995), the Commissioner conceded the validity of this concept.
139. 433 F.2d 1263, 1265 (1st Cir. 1970); Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 583
(4th Cir. 1961), aff’g 33 T.C. 1048, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 960 (1961).
140. See Geneva Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 67 T.C. 764, 773 (1977), aff’d,
622 F.2d 995 (9th Cir. 1980).
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The World Publishing Co. opinion holds that the $300,000 was amortizable as a premium paid by the taxpayer for the favorable aspects of
the lease and not as depreciation of the building. It is almost inconceivable that the taxpayer in that case would have paid $300,000 for a
building which, as such, would provide it with no income and would
have no value when the lease was terminated. In fact, the opinion enumerates 11 provisions of the lease which, in addition to rentals averaging $28,000 per year over the remaining 28 years of the lease term,
conferred various benefits and rights upon the lessor and, as a result of
the purchase, upon the taxpayer. While portions of the opinion could
be interpreted to refer to the building as a wasting asset, the holding
was . . . that: “The taxpayer’s spreading of the wasting portion of its
purchase price over the entire remaining lease term by the straight-line
method approximated the minimal deduction for the taxpayer.”141

The courts that have denied the existence of, or the amortization of the
interest in, premium rentals have followed one or more of the following
lines of reasoning. First, it is asserted that the taxpayer has not proven the
existence of the acquisition of premium rentals if the taxpayer failed to
show that the higher rentals were not consideration for renewal options,
purchase options, or lower purchase prices and were not compensated for
by lower renewal rentals.142 Second, it is argued that the interest in premium rentals will not be exhausted and, therefore, amortization is not
available if the rentals that can be obtained from the land after the termination of the ground lease will be equal to, or greater than, the rentals
payable under the ground lease or if the amount of such future rentals
cannot be determined.143 This second assertion, however, was convincingly answered by the Tax Court on remand in Moore.144
Other courts simply have taken the position that the premium rental
concept has no validity. The approach taken by these courts is that upon
acquisition of the fee interest in real estate, any lesser interest is merged
with the fee and merely contributes to the value of the fee.145 It is true that
the purchaser or heir of a fee interest that is not subject to a lease cannot
divide that fee interest into a right of use and a remainder and then amortize the right of use.146 However, when a purchaser or heir acquires a fee
141. Id. (quoting 299 F.2d at 617).
142. See Midler Court Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1975); Fieland v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 743 (1980).
143. See Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573, 583 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 960 (1961); Moore v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 265, 277-78 (9th Cir. 1953); Friend v.
Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939), aff’d, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir. 1941).
144. 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 869, 873 (1955); see supra notes 11-27 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Moore v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 1797 (1995); Schubert v.
Commissioner, 33 T.C. 1048 (1960), aff’d, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 960 (1961); Moore v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 906 (1950), rev’d, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Peters v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945);
Friend, 40 B.T.A. at 770-72.
146. Cf. Michaelis v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1175 (1970).
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interest subject to a ground lease, the fee and leasehold interests exist independent of any act by the purchaser or heir. These interests each have a
separate existence and do not merge; both the fee and the leasehold still
exist after acquisition. If the rent paid under the lease is equal to, or less
than, the rent that could be derived from the unencumbered fee, the lease
has no value apart from the fee. On the other hand, if premium rents are
present, the acquiring party can divide the acquisition into an acquisition
of the fee and an acquisition of the premium rents (the favorable aspects
of the lease) because each interest has a separate value. Each interest
makes its own contribution to the overall value. It is incorrect to say that
the lease merely adds value to the land. The value of the land is what it
can earn as an unencumbered fee. Any additional value is the result of the
existence of the lease and this value erodes over the term of the lease. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Moore, summarized the concept in the
following terms:
Now, if we were dealing with a taxpayer who . . . purchased [an] . . .
interest in the . . . property . . . and if it appeared that at that time the
rents being paid were in excess of the fair market rentals of the property, and if the price paid took this latter fact into consideration, it
must have included a bonus or premium for the acquisition of the
“favorable” features of the lease.147

Therefore, it is undeniable that a ground lease can have a value separate and apart from the value of the land subject to the ground lease. This
valuable interest can be acquired from the ground lessor by an heir or
purchaser. It can then be amortized over the remaining term of the ground
lease.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ground lessor may possess a number of valuable interests in addition to the interest in land subject to a ground lease. These interests
should be included in a decedent ground lessor’s estate, and they can be
acquired by a purchaser or an heir. Such valuable interests may include
a) a residuary interest in a lessee-constructed improvement;
b)a present interest in a lessee-constructed improvement that can be
used as security for borrowings by the ground lessor;
c) a present interest in a lessee-constructed improvement that acts as security for the lessee’s performance of its obligations under the ground
lease and makes the land more leasable in the event of the termination
of the ground lease; and, finally,
d)a present interest in the favorable aspects of the ground lease, including premium rentals and, possibly, the presence of a creditworthy and
desirable lessee.
147. 207 F.2d 265, 274 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954).
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What is necessary to persuade a court that a purchaser or heir has acquired one or more of these valuable interests and is entitled to a basis in
it that can be amortized or depreciated at some point in time? In order to
get a foot in the door, the value of the ground lessor’s interests for estate
tax purposes should be allocated, in preparing the estate tax return,
among the valuable interests the ground lessor possesses. Similarly, the
purchase price of the interests of a ground lessor should be allocated, in
the purchase agreement, among the interests. These allocations, while
getting the heir or purchaser off to a good start, do not appear to have any
negative effects on the decedent ground lessor’s estate or on the seller lessor. None of these interests should be regarded as income in respect of a
decedent. All of these interests should be treated as either capital assets or
real property used in trade or business or held for profit upon their sale.148
The purchaser from, or the heir of, a ground lessor should realize that
an attempt to demonstrate a depreciable or amortizable basis in each of
the interests described above requires a discrete analysis and presents
particular proof problems. For example, if the interest at issue is the
ground lessor’s residuary interest, the heir or purchaser must demonstrate
that the economic useful life of the lessee-constructed improvement exceeds the term of the ground lease.149 The lessee should be obligated to
deliver the lessee-constructed improvement to the lessor at the termination
of the lease, and the lessee, at the minimum, should be obligated to
maintain the improvement in good condition and repair, with normal wear
and tear excepted.150 Finally, the value of the residuary interest would be
the value of the lessee-constructed improvement as of the termination of the
lease and discounted to present value at the time of the heir’s or purchaser’s
acquisition. The heir’s or purchaser’s basis in the residuary interest acquired from the ground lessor is, after termination of the ground lease,
depreciable over the remaining useful life of the improvement. Neither
section 167(c)(2) nor section 197(e)(5) presents a problem since it is the
improvement that is being depreciated.
If the lessee-constructed improvement is to have value to the ground
lessor as a result of the lessor’s ability to use the improvement as security
for its own borrowings, it is clear that the ground lessor must acquire title
148. But see Schubert, 33 T.C. at 1053-54. In addition, section 167(c)(2) may present a
problem in connection with the classification of the interest in the favorable aspects of the
ground lease as section 1231 property. Since section 167(c)(2) prevents the amortization and
depreciation of the interest in the ground lease, it would have to be classified as real property
used in trade or business or held for profit in order to be treated as section 1231 property. See
I.R.C § 1231(b). While a lessor’s sale of the rent to become due pursuant to a ground lease
almost certainly would be treated as an anticipatory assignment of income, a sale of all the lessor’s rights and obligations under a ground lease, especially in conjunction with a sale of the
fee simple, should be treated as a conveyance of real property used in trade or business or held
for profit. Cf. Heim v. Fitzpatrick, 262 F.2d 887 (2d Cir. 1959).
149. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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to the lessee-constructed improvement upon its construction. In addition,
it may be necessary to have the lessee’s agreement that the ground lease
can be subordinated to a security interest in the improvement that secures
a loan to the lessor. This interest will increase in value as the lessee pays
off any financing and will decrease in value as the lessee-constructed improvement ages.
Valuation of this interest is difficult, but not impossible. Conceptually,
it is the value to the ground lessor, including an heir or purchaser, of the
ability to give a lender an interest in the improvement as security for a
loan to the lessor. The increased borrowing capacity and reduced interest
rate that the ground lessor acquires as a result of having this security to
give to a lender are important factors in valuing the interest. For example,
one can calculate the ground lessor’s return on borrowed money as applied to the additional borrowing capacity. The interest charged on the
additional borrowing is then subtracted and the difference capitalized. If
the additional security results in an interest rate reduction, the reduction
in the interest rate can be capitalized. The purchaser or heir can depreciate this interest over the remaining useful life of the improvement. Since
it is the improvement that is depreciated, neither section 167(c)(2) nor
section 197(e)(5) presents any problems.
The ground lessor has a potentially valuable interest in a lesseeconstructed improvement if the improvement acts as security for the lessee’s performance of its obligations pursuant to the ground lease.151 While
it can be asserted that this value is embedded in the lease, the lesseeconstructed improvement is necessary to create this value. The erosion of
the value of the improvement reduces the value of this interest. The value
is present only in conjunction with the lease, but it is determined by the
improvement.
In order to demonstrate the existence of this interest, it must be shown
that the nature of the lessee-constructed improvement and the lessee’s investment therein are such that the lessee would be reluctant to lose
them.152 As a result, it would be unlikely that the lessee would breach the
lease or try to buy out of the lease. If this is the case, the lesseeconstructed improvement can be said to contribute substantially to the dependability of the rental stream under the ground lease.153
The financing of the lessee-constructed improvement is important in
making the above demonstration. For example, if the lessee used no financing and paid the entire cost of a substantial lessee-constructed improvement or was personally liable for the financing thereof, the lessee
151. In addition to being security for the lessee’s performance of the ground lease, the lessee-constructed improvement will have value to the ground lessor if the improvement makes it
easier to lease the premises should the lessee default and/or the ground lease terminate.
152. See supra notes 93-112 and accompanying text.
153. It may also aid in securing a new rental stream should the lessee breach the lease.
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would be hesitant to take the chance of losing it. On the other hand, if the
lessee financed 100% of the cost of the improvement using a nonrecourse
mortgage, the lessee would be much less reluctant to lose the improvement. Thus, the lessee’s equity in the improvement and the lessee’s personal liability for the financing of the improvement are significant in determining the value of this interest.
In general, the value of this interest to the ground lessor can be said to
be the capitalized value of the reduction in rental return that a ground lessor will accept as a result of the increased dependability of the rental
stream resulting from the lessee-constructed improvement. This interest
will lose value as the lessee-constructed improvement grows older but,
possibly, will gain some value as the lessee acquires more equity in the
improvement. Since this interest loses value as the improvement ages, the
heir or purchaser should be able to depreciate its basis over the remaining
useful life of the improvement. Sections 167(c)(2) and 197(e)(5) should
have no effect because it is the improvement that is being depreciated. It
may be urged that the cost of this interest should be amortized over the
remaining term of the ground lease. If this position is accepted, sections
167(c)(2) and 197(e)(5) will prevent the amortization. This interest, however, is better considered as an interest in the improvement because it is a
result of the construction of the improvement and erodes as the improvement ages. Since this is so, the taxpayer should be able to depreciate the
basis of the interest over the remaining life of the improvement. At least,
this should be the case if the improvement is considered subject to the
lease under section 167(c)(2).154 Since the seller or decedent ground lessor
holds this valuable interest, it would certainly seem to be subject to the
lease.
To establish that the ground lessor has a valuable interest in premium
rents (the advantageous aspects of the ground lease),155 an heir or a purchaser must demonstrate that the rent currently payable under the ground
lease is greater than the rent that could be obtained from the land unencumbered by the ground lease.156 In addition, it must be shown that the excess
rent is not consideration for a renewal or purchase option or for the purchase of the land and that is not compensated for by lower rents during renewal periods.157 The reason for the excess rent should be demonstrated.
For example, it may be that the ground lessor was an excellent negotiator
and obtained rent which was in excess of the rent that the land subject to the
ground lease would normally produce.158 The other, and more common,
154. See I.R.C. § 167(c)(2).
155. The premium rentals, and possibly the creditworthiness and desirability of the lessee,
add to the value of the ground lease.
156. See supra notes 113-22 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
158. However, the Third Circuit in Midler questioned such an argument:
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explanation for the excess rent is that the land unencumbered by the ground
lease will produce less rent than that provided under the ground lease at the
time of the acquisition of the ground lessor’s interest because there has been
a decrease in the fair rental value of similar land since the execution of the
lease.159
The rent that the land will produce after termination of the ground lease
should not be relevant to whether premium rents exist.160 Enough courts,
however, have thought this fact relevant161 that, if possible, it should be
demonstrated that the rent the land will produce after termination of the
ground lease will be below the rent payable pursuant to the lease. On the
other hand, if the rent after termination will not be less than the current
rent, or if the determination of such rent is entirely too speculative, the taxpayer should argue that the rent after termination is not relevant to whether
premium rents exist.162 The assets that the heir or purchaser acquires are the
premium rents produced by, and the other positive aspects of, the ground
lease to which the land is subject. These assets erode in value as the ground
lease approaches termination, regardless of the amount of rent the unencumbered land would then produce.
As mentioned above, the value of this interest is determined by the difference between the rent payable under the ground lease and the rent that
could be obtained from the unencumbered fee at the time of the acquisition of the ground lessor’s interest. The difference should be capitalized
to produce the value of the premium rents. The basis of this interest
should be amortized over the term of the lease since the erosion of the
value of this interest is measured by, at best, the term of the lease. If this
amortization is permitted, both the income (the excess rental) and the expense of producing the income (the cost of acquiring the premium rental)
The existence of “premium” rentals . . . [as a result of skillful negotiation by the
ground lessor] is inherently suspect in an arm’s length transaction, especially in a
transaction involving substantial rentals payable over a long period of time. In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we assume that . . . [a ground lessee] agreed to
pay the . . . [ground lessor] the minimum rental for which it thought it could obtain
the premises. Thus, any “premium” rent would have resulted from an error by . . .
[the ground lessee] in judging the lowest obtainable rent or from some imperfection
in the market. We are unwilling to burden the tax collection process with speculative
inquiries into the relative fortunes of lessors and lessees at the bargaining table. We
doubt that after-the-fact administrative and judicial proceedings will lead to a more
precise determination of fair rental value than that upon which the parties to a lease
agree in arm’s length negotiations.
Midler Court Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 521 F.2d 767, 769 (3d Cir. 1975).
159. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
160. See Moore v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 869 (1955).
161. See, e.g., Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366
U.S. 960 (1961); Moore v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347
U.S. 942 (1954); Friend v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 768 (1939), aff’d, 119 F.2d 959 (7th
Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941).
162. See Moore, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) at 873.
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are matched. Sections 167(c)(2) and 197(e)(5), however, prevent the
matching of income and expense by prohibiting the amortization or depreciation of the leasehold. While this distortion of income might not be
of great concern if the cost of the interest could be amortized over the
remaining life of an improvement, in this case it is the land rather than an
improvement that is subject to the lease. As a result, not only is the rental
income not reduced by an expense of producing it, but this expense can be
recovered only by reducing sale proceeds, which may be received many
years after the rental income is earned. Consequently, sections 167(c)(2)
and 197(e)(5) should be amended to permit a purchaser or heir to acquire
a basis in a ground lease and, subsequently, the amortization of that basis.

